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Abstract
For neural models to garner widespread public
trust and ensure fairness, we must have human-
intelligible explanations for their predictions.
Recently, an increasing number of works focus
on explaining the predictions of neural models
in terms of the relevance of the input features.
In this work, we show that feature-based ex-
planations pose problems even for explaining
trivial models. We show that, in certain cases,
there exist at least two ground-truth feature-
based explanations, and that, sometimes, nei-
ther of them is enough to provide a complete
view of the decision-making process of the
model. Moreover, we show that two popular
classes of explainers, Shapley explainers and
minimal sufficient subsets explainers, target
fundamentally different types of ground-truth
explanations, despite the apparently implicit
assumption that explainers should look for one
specific feature-based explanation. These find-
ings bring an additional dimension to consider
in both developing and choosing explainers.
1 Introduction
A large number of explanatory methods have
been developed with the goal of shedding light
on black-box neural models (Ribeiro et al., 2016;
Lundberg and Lee, 2017; Simonyan et al., 2014;
Sundararajan et al., 2017; Carter et al., 2019;
Camburu et al., 2018; Park et al., 2018; Kim et al.,
2018). The majority of these methods explain the
prediction of a model in terms of relevance of
the input features (e.g., tokens for text). In this
work, we show that explaining the predictions
of even trivial models using only input features
can be problematic. We show that there can
be more than one ground-truth feature-based
explanation and that two prevalent classes of
explainers—Shapley explainers and minimal
sufficient subsets (MSSs) explainers—target fun-
damentally different ground-truth explanations,
without explicitly mentioning it. On the contrary,
current works seem to imply that there is only
one ground-truth feature-based explanation for a
prediction. We reveal strengths and limitations of
each of the two types and show that, sometimes,
neither of them can unambiguously reflect the
decision-making process of a model. Our findings
encourage deeper reflections on the types of
explanations that one aims to provide, and give
users an additional dimension to consider in order
to pick an explainer.
2 Background
Among existing feature-based explainers, there
are two major classes: (i) feature-additive and
(ii) minimal sufficient subsets. To formally de-
scribe them, let m be a model to be explained and
x an instance with a potentially variable number
n = |x| of features: x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn). For ex-
ample, xi may be the i-th token in the input text x.
2.1 Feature-additivity
A feature-additive explanation for the prediction
m(x) consists of a set of importance weights
{wi(m, x)}i associated with the features in x
such that their sum approximates the prediction1
minus the bias of the model:
∑|x|
i=1wi(m, x) =
m(x) − m(b), where b is the baseline input,
i.e., an input that brings no information, such
as a zero-vector (Chen et al., 2018). The higher
the absolute value of a weight, the more impor-
tant the feature is for the prediction. The sign
indicates whether the feature pulls towards the
prediction (positive) or against it (negative). A
large number of explanatory methods are feature-
additive (Arras et al., 2017; Shrikumar et al.,
2017; Ribeiro et al., 2016; Lundberg and Lee,
2017; Sundararajan et al., 2017).
1For classification, the probability of the predicted class.
m: IF “very good” IN INPUT: RETURN 0.9;
ELSE IF “nice” IN INPUT: RETURN 0.7;
ELSE IF “good” IN INPUT: RETURN 0.6;
ELSE RETURN 0.
x1: “The movie was good, it was actually nice.” x2: “The movie was nice, in fact, it was very good.”
m(x1) = 0.7 m(x2) = 0.9
Shapley explanation MSS explanation Shapley explanation MSS explanation
1. “nice”: 0.4 {“nice”} 1. “good”: 0.417 {“good”, “very”}
2. “good”: 0.3 2. “nice”: 0.367
3. “very”: 0.116
Figure 1: Examples of cases with at least two ground-truth feature-based explanations. The Shapley values were
computed via Eq. 1; the non-mentioned features received 0 weight.
Shapley values. Lundberg and Lee (2017) aim
to unify all feature-additive explanatory methods
by showing that the only set of importance weights
that verify three properties (local accuracy, miss-
ingness, and consistency—we refer to their paper
for details) is given by the Shapley values from
coalitional game theory, i.e.,
wi(m, x) =
∑
x′⊆x\{xi}
|x′|!(|x| − |x′| − 1)!
|x|!
[m(x′ ∪{xi})−m(x
′)] ,
(1)
where the sum enumerates over all subsets x′ of
features in x that do not include the feature for
which the weight is computed. Lundberg and Lee
(2017) provide methods (e.g., KernelSHAP) for
approximating the Shapley values.
2.2 Minimal Sufficient Subsets
An MSS explanation of m(x) consists of a sub-
set of features mss(m, x) ⊆ x such that the model
gives (almost) the same prediction based only on
the information from mss(m, x), and no other sub-
set of mss(m, x) leads m to the same prediction,
i.e.,
m(mss(m, x)) = m(x) and (2)
∀s′ ⊂ mss(m, x) : m(s′) 6= m(x). (3)
To compute the prediction on a subset of fea-
tures, one can eliminate the other features by oc-
clusion (via a baseline feature) or deletion (if pos-
sible). MSSs explainers are increasingly popular
(Chen et al., 2018; Yoon et al., 2019; Carter et al.,
2019; Ribeiro et al., 2018).
3 Two Types of Ground-Truth
Feature-Based Explanations
We show that, in certain cases, there exist more
than one ground-truth feature-based explanation
for a prediction, and that Shapley and MSSs ex-
plainers target two such different types of ground-
truth explanations for even trivial models. We also
reveal strengths and limitations for each type, and
we show that, sometimes, none of them is enough
to provide a complete view on a model. To illus-
trate our findings, we give examples of hypotheti-
cal sentiment analysis models. Such models take
as input a review and output a score reflecting the
sentiment of the review towards the object of in-
terest or towards an aspect of the object (for multi-
aspect reviews) (McAuley et al., 2012). We treat
the scores as real numbers linearly reflecting the
intensity of the sentiment, with −1 the most nega-
tive, 1 the most positive, hence, 0 being the neutral
score. W.l.o.g., we assume that scores that differ
by at least 0.1 indicate significantly different senti-
ments.
An example of a model m and two instances,
each with two ground-truth feature-based explana-
tions, is given in Fig. 1. The prediction ofm on the
instance x1 ism(x1) = 0.7, as “nice” is present in
the instance. Hence, one can argue that “nice” is
the only important feature for this prediction. On
the other hand, one may argue that “good” should
also be flagged as important, because if “nice” is
eliminated, then the model relies on “good” to pro-
vide a score as high as 0.6 instead of the much
lower default of 0. The difficulty faced when try-
ing to explain m with feature-based explanations
is even more pronounced on the instance x2. The
model predicts m(x2) = 0.9, as “very good” is
in x2. Hence, an explanation that states that the
features “very” and “good” are the only important
features for this prediction is one ground-truth ex-
planation. However, if “good” is eliminated from
this instance, the model relies on “nice” (and not
on “very”) to provide a score as high as 0.7, while
if both “good” and “nice”are eliminated, then the
score drops all the way to 0. From this perspective,
“nice” can be seen as more important than “very”,
and an explanation that ranks “good”, “nice”, and
“very” in this order of importance is also a ground-
1. ASPECT INDICATORS = {“taste”, “smell”, “appearance”} (AND ANY VARIATION, SUCH AS “Tastes”)
2. SENTIMENT INDICATORS = {“amazing”→ 1, “good”→ 0.6, “refreshing” → 0.6, “bad”→−0.6, “peculiar”→ −0.3, “horrible” →−1}
3. A SENTIMENT INDICATOR IS ASSOCIATED TO ITS CLOSEST ASPECT (OCCLUDED TOKENS ARE COUNTED).
4. AN OCCLUDED TOKEN IS CONSIDERED TO BE NEUTRAL.
5. IF MORE SENTIMENT INDICATORS ARE ASSOCIATED TO AN ASPECT, THEN
(i) IF ALL ARE OF THE SAME SIGN: THE SCORE FOR THAT ASPECT IS THE SCORE OF THE STRONGEST SENTIMENT.
(ii) IF THERE ARE BOTH POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE SENTIMENTS ASSOCIATED TO THE ASPECT: THE SCORE FOR THAT ASPECT IS
THE THRESHOLDED SUM OF SCORES (MAX(MIN(SUM SCORES, 1), −1)).
mO: s = SUM OF SCORES OF ASPECTS mS: RETURN SCORE OF SMELL mT: RETURN SCORE OF TASTE
RETURN MAX(MIN(s, 1), −1)
xS1: “Tastes horrible, peculiar smell.” xT1: “Tastes good, refreshing.”
xO: “The beer has an amazing appearance, mS(xS1) = −0.3 mT(xT1) = 0.6
a good smell, a bad taste.”
mO(xO) = 1 Shapley explanation MSS explanation Shapley explanation MSSs explanations
1. ”smell“: −0.29 {“peculiar”, “smell”} 1. “Tastes”: 0.4 {“Tastes”, “good”},
Shapley explanation MSS explanation 2. ”Tastes“: 0.26 2. “good”: 0.1, {“Tastes”, “refreshing”}
1. “amazing”: 0.52 {“amazing”, “appearance”} 3. ”horrible“: −0.14 “refreshing”: 0.1
2. “good”: 0.40 4. ”peculiar“: −0.13
3. “bad”: −0.23
4. “smell”: 0.15
5. “appearance”: 0.12 xS2: “Tastes amazing, peculiar smell.” xT2: “Tastes amazing. The smell is also amazing.”
6. “taste”: 0.03 mS(xS2) = −0.3 mT(xT2) = 0.6
Shapley explanation MSS explanation Shapley explanation MSSs explanations
1. “peculiar”: −0.27 {“peculiar”, “smell”} 1. “Tastes”: 0.58 {“Tastes”, “amazing1”},
2. “smell”: −0.10 2. “amazing1”: 0.42 {“Tastes”, “amazing2”}
3. “amazing”: 0.05 3. “amazing2”: 0.08
4. “Tastes”: 0.02 4. “smell”: −0.08
Figure 2: Examples illustrating the strengths and limitations of the two types of feature-based explanations, as
presented in Section 3.1. The five rules are common to all three models. The Shapley values were computed via
Eq. 1, and written in decreasing order of their importance (absolute value); the non-mentioned features received 0
weight. In the last example, the superscript of “amazing” differentiates between its two occurrences.
truth explanation. Therefore, there are two funda-
mentally different perspectives on what a ground-
truth feature-based explanation should be, even for
this trivial model.
Shapley vs. MSSs. The above two types of
ground-truth explanations are separately advo-
cated by Shapley and MSSs explainers, as shown
in Fig. 1. In particular, notice how the Shapley
explanation attributes to “very” about three times
less importance than to “nice” for m(x2), while
“nice” does not even make it in the MSS explana-
tion.
This difference stems from the fact that Shap-
ley values were introduced to promote fairness in
distributing a total gain among the players of a
coalition (Shapley, 1951). Hence, they provide
the average importance of the features on a neigh-
borhood of the instance, taking into account each
player’s performance in any sub-coalition. On the
other hand, MSSs explanations provide the fea-
tures that are pointwise important for the predic-
tion on the instance in isolation, rewarding only
the players that are crucial inside the full coalition.
Not always distinct. Although the two types of
explanations are distinct for certain cases, in other
cases they coincide. For example, for the modelm
in Fig. 1 and instances that contain exactly one of
the subphrases “very good”, “nice”, and “good”,
such as “The movie was good.”, both types of ex-
planations point towards the same features.
Literature. To our knowledge, the exis-
tence of two types of ground-truth feature-
based explanations was only briefly alluded
by Sundararajan et al. (2017) when explain-
ing the function min(x1, x2) on the instance
x1 = 1, x2 = 3. Their method attributes the whole
importance weight (of 1 = min(1, 3)−min(0, 0))
to the critical feature x1, while Shapley attributes
0.5 importance weight to each feature. They
mention that preferring one explanation over the
other is subjective.
On the other hand, Lundberg and Lee (2017)
state2 that all participants in their user study ex-
plained the function max(x1, x2, x3)
3 on the in-
put x1=5, x2 =4, x3 =0 by attributing the impor-
tance weights of 3 for x1, 2 for x2, and 0 for x3,
implying that the Shapley explanation is the only
ground-truth explanation for this function. How-
ever, the authors do not mention the number of
2Via a graph of results (their Fig. 4).
3Devised as a story of three people making money based
on the maximum score that any of them achieved.
participants nor the guidelines that they received.
Moreover, current works, such as (Chen et al.,
2018) and (Yoon et al., 2019), compare MSSs ex-
plainers (e.g., L2X and INVASE) with Shapley
explainers on identifying the features used by a
model trained on synthetic datasets, where the
ground-truth important features are known. While
the particular synthetic datasets used in these
works do not violate either of the two ground-truth
explanations, this is not mentioned at the time of
comparison. Such comparisons risk to induce the
idea that there is always only one feature-based ex-
planation.
3.1 Strengths and Limitations
In this section, we reveal strengths and limitations
of the two approaches presented above.
Redundant features. By looking only at the
Shapley explanation for m(x1) in Fig. 1, one can-
not know whether (1) the model requires both fea-
tures “nice” and “good” to make its prediction
of 0.7 (which is not the case for m), or (2) one
of these features is redundant in the presence of
the other (which is the case for m). In contrast,
MSSs explanations do not contain redundant fea-
tures (Eq. 3), and hence, the MSS explanation for
m(x1) is able to distinguish between the two sce-
narios.
Feature cancellations: genuine vs. artefacts.
In certain cases, there exist features that cancel
each other out. Consider the model mO in Fig. 2,
which infers the overall sentiment on a beer from
a multi-aspect review by adding up the scores that
it associates to each aspect in the review. On
the instance xO, mO predicts 1 by taking into ac-
count all three aspects. However, the MSS expla-
nation is {“amazing”, “appearance”}—it does not
contain the features “bad”, “taste”, “good”, and
“smell”, due to Eq. 3. Arguably, users may want
to see the features from such a genuine cancella-
tion in the explanation. Note that these features
are flagged as important by the Shapley explana-
tion, which, nonetheless, does not clearly indi-
cate the perfect cancellation between “good smell”
and “bad taste”. Moreover, the Shapley explana-
tion gives the impression that “smell” and “appear-
ance” are much more important (0.15 and 0.12)
than “taste” (0.03), when, by design, mO equally
takes into account all aspects. Hence, neither the
Shapley nor the MSS explanation is well reflecting
the decision-making process for mO(xO).
Artefacts may occur when eliminating features
from an instance, distorting the importance of
certain features. Model mS in Fig. 2 illustrates
such an example. When mS is applied to xS1,
it predicts −0.3, and the MSS explanation is
{“peculiar”, “smell”}, which, arguably, best re-
flects the decision-making process for mS(xS1).
However, in the Shapley explanation ,“Tastes” ap-
pears to be twice more important than “peculiar”,
and “horrible” appears as important as “peculiar”,
even though “peculiar” is the actual sentiment in-
dicator for smell. Furthermore, note how the Shap-
ley importance weights dramatically change when
only the sentiment on taste is changed in instance
xS2, even thoughmS does not rely on the sentiment
on taste to predict the sentiment on smell.
Multiple MSSs: genuine vs. artefacts. In cer-
tain cases, there can exist multiple MSSs expla-
nations for one prediction. For example, for the
model mT and instance xT1 in Fig. 2, either of
the features “good” and “refreshing” leads to the
score of 0.6. Ideally, MSSs explainers provide all
the genuine MSSs, e.g., both {“Tastes”, “good”}
and {“Tastes”, “refreshing”}. However, many
MSSs explainers are designed to retrieve only one
MSS (Chen et al., 2018; Yoon et al., 2019). An ex-
ception is the SIS explainer (Carter et al., 2019),
which retrieves a set of disjoint MSSs, which
might also not be exhaustive (e.g., SIS would not
retrieve the second MSS explanation for mT(xT1),
because “Tastes” is already taken by the first MSS).
On the other hand, the Shapley explanation gives
the same importance to both “good” and “refresh-
ing”. However, with this explanation alone, one
would not be able to know whether both “good”
and “refreshing” are necessary to be present or if
each individually suffices for the prediction of 0.6.
Artefacts occurring when eliminating features
can also lead certain subsets of features to appear
as MSSs. For example, for mT and xT2 in Fig. 2,
either of the two occurrences of “amazing” forms
an MSS, but the second one is not reflecting the
decision-making process of the model. The Shap-
ley explanation makes the distinction in this case.
Discussion. Our findings suggest that the use
of both the MSS and the Shapley explanation to-
gether could lead to a better understanding of the
decision-making process of a model for a predic-
tion. For example, on the instance x1 in Fig. 1,
if one has both the Shapley and the MSS explana-
tion, one would conclude that “nice” is enough for
the prediction of the model on that instance, and
that “good” is redundant in the presence of “nice”
but still an informative feature for this model. Sim-
ilarly, fir the instance xO in Fig. 2, having both ex-
planations allows one to conclude that the model
cancels out “good smell” and “bad taste”, which
would not have been possible to infer from any of
the two explanations alone. Hence, by categoriz-
ing the differences between the two types of ex-
plainers, our work shows their complementariness,
provides as quick action the usage of both types
of explanations, and opens the path towards more
combinations of features, such as counterfactual or
examples-based explanations.
We use simple rule-based models to expose the
problematic characteristics of the explainers, first
because one does not know how a complex neural
network makes its decisions, which is the reason
in the first place to develop explainers. Hence, we
assess the explainers on rule-based models whose
inner workings we know. Second, if explainers
exhibit certain problems even on simple models,
very likely, these problems would only increase
with the complexity of the model to be explained.
Third, the rule-based models that we exemplify
are not at all unrealistic: neural networks were
shown to learn to rely on combinations of input
features to provide their predictions in different
tasks, for natural language processing and beyond
(see, e.g., (Gururangan et al., 2018; Ribeiro et al.,
2018)). Hence, we expect that the problems that
we raised with the simple rule-based examples
would only get worse when the explainers are ap-
plied to real-world neural models.
4 Summary and Outlook
In this work, we showed that, for certain cases,
there is more than one ground-truth feature-based
explanation for the prediction of a model, and that
Shapley explainers and MSSs explainers aim to
provide two such fundamentally different ground-
truth explanations. We also provided insights into
the strengths and limitations of these types of ex-
planations. Future work includes user studies to
decide to what extent users benefit from each of
these types of explanations or from their combi-
nation. Most importantly, this work encourages
future reflections on the types of explanations that
we provide.
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